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C
entral bank lending is widely regarded as a vital part of the public
safety net supporting the stability of the banking system and ﬁnancial
markets. An independent central bank can provide liquidity to ﬁnan-
cial institutions on very short notice.1 Indeed, central bank lending has been
a prominent part of regulatory assistance to troubled ﬁnancial institutions in
recent years. The idea of a central bank as lender of last resort, however, has
been around at least since Walter Bagehot wrote about it over 100 years ago.2
For most of that time it was taken for granted that central bank lending had
beneﬁts with little or no cost. In the past decade, that view has been challenged.
For instance, in the United States the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 recognized that Federal Reserve lending
to undercapitalized banks has the potential to impose higher resolution costs on
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). More recently, the idea that
lending by the International Monetary Fund has led to increased risk-taking
in international ﬁnancial markets is being taken seriously by ﬁnancial market
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1 Because a central bank can create money, it has the option of ﬁnancing lending with an
increase in the money supply. We would call such lending a combination of monetary policy
and credit policy. When we speak of central bank lending in this article, however, we conﬁne
ourselves to pure credit policy. Pure central bank credit policy ﬁnances loans with proceeds from
the sale of securities (Goodfriend and King 1988).
2 See Humphrey and Keleher (1984).
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 85/4 Fall 1999 1     
2 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
participants and policymakers alike.3 In the United States, ﬁnancial economists
have acknowledged “moral hazard” to be a problem for government ﬁnancial
guarantees ever since the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.
In this article we look at central bank lending in light of the concerns about
moral hazard. Our aim is a practical one: we present principles to help guide
central bank lending. Our approach builds on the observation that central bank
lending is a publicly provided line of credit. Commercial lines of credit and
central bank lending are similar in that both provide substantial funding on
very short notice.
Line-of-credit products are complex. We use recent advances in the theory
of ﬁnancial contracts to interpret the structure of loan commitments. By dissect-
ing the incentive implications of the contractual obligations and rights involved
in credit lines, we appreciate the tensions present in line-of-credit relationships.
In particular, we see how contract terms control the ex post incentives of the
borrower and the lender under limited commitment to assure that the line-of-
credit product is efﬁcient. We then employ our understanding of these issues
to benchmark and inform our analysis of central bank lending.
The nature of the problem is this: A line-of-credit product is designed to
meet the current obligations of a ﬁrm when it is judged to be illiquid though
solvent. Inevitably, then, a loan commitment shifts potential losses from short-
to longer-term claimants. For instance, a commercial bank’s line of credit to
an ordinary business has the potential to shift losses to the borrowing ﬁrm’s
long-term bondholders and residual claimants. Analogously, a central bank’s
line of credit has the potential to shift losses from uninsured creditors to the
deposit insurance fund or general taxpayers. Likewise, lending by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund to ﬁnance a country’s balance-of-payments deﬁcit has
the potential to shift losses from short-term creditors of that country to the
country’s taxpayers.4
Private line-of-credit agreements, together with the ﬁrm’s capital structure,
balance the liquidation costs of a conservative lending policy against the moral
hazard associated with more liberal lending. Covenant provisions in line-of-
credit agreements give private lenders the ability and the incentive to constrain
credit to insolvent ﬁrms when appropriate. In contrast, central banks appear to
lack explicit institutional mechanisms to credibly precommit to limit lending.
An excessively liberal central bank line of credit makes short-term capital more
inclined to move in the direction of favorable yield differentials irrespective
3 Strictly speaking the International Monetary Fund is not a central bank since it does not have
the power to create money. Nevertheless, it is ﬁnancially a relatively independent governmental
organization, and it does make large loans on relatively short notice to countries in ﬁnancial
distress (Masson and Mussa 1995).
4 Some dilution of long-term claimants is desirable, however, to avoid socially inefﬁcient
liquidation (Diamond 1993).    
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of the risk involved, with the idea that the credit line could ﬁnance a quick
withdrawal.
The inability to commit to limit lending is the principal weakness of cen-
tral bank lending policy. The problem is that central banks responsible for the
stability of the ﬁnancial system are inclined to lend whenever not lending could
plausibly trigger a systemic crisis. That inclination encourages both domestic
and international “hot money” investments—short-term investments that im-
plicitly rely on central bank liquidity support for repayment in the event of
a crisis—and thereby increases the scope for violent reversals and ﬂights to
safety whenever the market begins to doubt central bank lending intentions.
We are agnostic about whether there is a welfare-enhancing role for central
bank lending. The critical policy problem is how to limit central bank lending
to socially appropriate circumstances.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 1 contains a description of the
structure and mechanics of private lines of credit. In Section 2, central bank
lending is characterized as a line of credit and the line-of-credit analogy is
exploited to identify the nature and source of the undesirable consequences
of lending by central banks. In Section 3, we consider how well some actual
and possible components of central bank lending policy cope with the problem
of limited commitment. We conclude that no simple institutional mechanisms
could conﬁdently precommit a central bank to limit its lending. Reasoning by
analogy to the historical reduction of inﬂation, we argue that the only way for
a central bank to credibly limit lending is for it to build up a reputation over
time for lending restraint. Exploiting the inﬂation analogy further, we describe
a sequence of events that we think will be necessary for a central bank to
successfully acquire such a reputation.
1. THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE LINES OF CREDIT
The parallel between central bank lending and private lending under lines of
credit is illuminating for the similarities and the differences that emerge (Good-
friend and King 1988). Both involve lending large amounts on short notice.
However, private credit lines are explicit contractual commitments, while a
central bank’s commitment to lend is a matter of policy choice. In this section
we review the economics of private lines of credit. We will focus in particular
on what determines the contingencies under which private banks deny credit.
The Line of Credit Product
Lines of credit (loan commitments) specify a maximum amount that can be
borrowed and a formula that determines the interest rate on advances, or
“take-downs.” Borrowing rates are usually set as a ﬁxed markup over a refer-
ence rate such as the LIBOR or the lending bank’s prime rate. Borrowers pay  
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an up-front fee when the line of credit is initiated, as well as an annual “com-
mitment fee” proportional to either the undrawn portion or the entire amount
of the commitment (Crane 1973, Schockley 1995). Line-of-credit lending is
generally secured by collateral, although the largest and most creditworthy
borrowers can obtain unsecured loan commitments. Some loan commitments
provide “back-up” support for commercial paper issued by the ﬁrm; the loan
is drawn down in the event that the ﬁrm cannot roll over its maturing paper.
In this case the line of credit provides a bank guarantee for the liquidity of
the commercial paper issued by the ﬁrm, assuring holders of an orderly exit in
adverse circumstances (Calomiris 1998).
Loan commitment agreements contain covenants that place restrictions on
the borrower’s future ﬁnancial condition. If the borrower violates one of the
covenants, the lender has the right (though not the obligation) to terminate the
agreement and demand immediate repayment. Some covenants utilize speciﬁc
ﬁnancial indicators—minimum net worth, minimum working capital, or max-
imum leverage ratio, for example. Other covenants restrict the disposition of
assets or the issuance of other debt.
Loan commitment agreements also generally contain a clause that allows
the bank to declare a default in the event of any “materially adverse change
in the ﬁnancial condition of the borrower.” This ambiguously worded clause
provides a backstop to the other formal covenants, allowing the lender to ter-
minate lending when the borrower’s ﬁnancial condition deteriorates, even if
the speciﬁc covenants are technically satisﬁed. At the same time, a borrower
that is in good ﬁnancial health can be assured that the bank is still obligated
to lend.
Because the markup does not vary with subsequent changes in the bor-
rower’s creditworthiness, the line of credit represents an implicit insurance
arrangement—a credit risk derivative. The implicit ex post insurance payout
in a given state of the world is the present value of the difference between
the contractual markup and the risk premium appropriate to that borrower in
that state of the world. The contract does not provide full insurance, however,
because the bank can limit large payouts by invoking covenants and denying
credit. This partial insurance is valuable to borrowers as a way of smoothing
the cost of contingent funding across various states of the world. Without a
line of credit, the ﬁrm would pay a high risk premium if it needed funds when
creditworthiness had deteriorated. With a line of credit, the ﬁrm pays ex ante
fees and agrees to the possibility that credit is denied in some states in order
to assure ex post access to funds at a lower risk premium. The ex ante fees
compensate the bank for the implicit insurance provided.
Lines of credit tend to be provided by ﬁnancial intermediaries, in general,
and banks, in particular. By diversifying over a large number of risks that are to
some degree independent, banks can offer insurance-like products at low cost.
Bank loan ofﬁcers specialize in evaluating creditworthiness, and are ideally      
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suited to monitor the borrower’s condition over the life of the commitment.
Such information gathering, built up through repeated interactions with the
borrower, is crucial in evaluating later requests by the borrower to take down
credit. In addition, bank monitoring activities save costs for other creditors.
Historically, lending and related credit evaluation activities often have been
combined with the issue of demand deposits (Goodfriend 1991, Nakamura
1993). Because of these advantages, banking institutions have traditionally
dominated the line-of-credit business.
Agency Problems
Modern theory explains ﬁnancial contracts as the result of ex ante negotia-
tion among contracting parties in the context of competition from alternative
borrowers and lenders. Contractual provisions help control agency problems—
adverse incentives that may arise due to asymmetric information during the
course of a contractual relationship. Bargaining is presumed to lead to contrac-
tual arrangements that are efﬁcient in the sense that no other feasible contracts
would make one party better off without making some other party worse off.
Competition ensures that no contracting party is worse off than it would be if
it contracted with another party instead.5
When banks lend to commercial ﬁrms, the critical agency problem is man-
agerial moral hazard. Many managerial actions are difﬁcult or impossible to
specify as explicit conditions of the contract, either because they are not easily
veriﬁable by the lender or a court, or because their complexity makes them too
costly to include. Continuing to operate the business often yields private ben-
eﬁts to the manager-borrower, known as “control rents,” which are impossible
to transfer to outsiders. The manager may have signiﬁcant human capital tied
to the existing organization and operation, the value of which might be lost or
diminished in a closure or liquidation. Also, the manager may enjoy perquisites
from controlling the cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm. More fundamentally, inducing the
manager to take actions that beneﬁt the ﬁrm might require giving the manager
a pecuniary interest in the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. Borrowers and lenders may in some
circumstances have conﬂicting interests over such actions. When the net worth
of the ﬁrm is low, the manager’s interest in the continuation of the ﬁrm strongly
resembles an option; the manager would reap much of the upside gain in the
business, while the costs of a deterioration would affect mainly the creditors.
The manager can have a distorted incentive to make “all-or-nothing” gambles
on excessively risky prospects.
If left unchecked, the moral hazard problem at a ﬁrm tends to grow over
time. Losses erode net worth to the point where risk incentives shift. The ﬁrm
begins to seek out investments with large potential payoffs, hoping to gamble
5 See Harris and Raviv (1991, 1992) for surveys of the ﬁnancial contracting literature.  
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its way back to health. The cost of such investments is below-normal rates
of return under conditions in which the large payoffs are not realized. As a
result, net worth is most likely to erode further, exacerbating the moral hazard
problem. Each round of losses further strengthens risk-taking incentives.
Moral hazard can involve more than just the borrower. Other creditors
will adopt a strategy that depends on the behavior of the ﬁrm’s line-of-credit
provider. If a lender pulls a line of credit that backs up a commercial paper
program in a situation in which the borrower does not have the funds to roll
over maturing claims, the ﬁrm defaults and investors may take a loss. The rate
of return on the commercial paper will therefore reﬂect market expectations
about the future funding behavior of the lender. Overly lax lending policy will
show up as an inappropriately small risk premium on the ﬁrm’s commercial
paper or as an overly generous willingness to lend on the part of private in-
vestors. This issue is crucial for ﬁrms with illiquid assets that wish to issue
liquid liabilities, because their creditors will be particularly concerned about
prospects for future liquidity. A lender who is conﬁdent of the solvency of
the ﬁrm will be willing to lend, while a lender who believes that the ﬁrm is
insolvent will likely withdraw funds.
At the time the lending contract is negotiated, the contracting parties will
anticipate the agency problems that could arise. Financial contracts deal with
agency problems in two ways. First, contractual conditions explicitly constrain
a manager’s decisions. Such constraints show up in lending agreements as loan
covenants, which we discuss in detail below. Second, contractual provisions
affect the contingencies which force a change in control that removes the man-
ager of the ﬁrm from a decision-making role. Liquidation is a leading example;
the ﬁrm’s tangible assets are sold and the proceeds are distributed to creditors.
A “reorganization” supervised by a bankruptcy court is another type of change
in control; management is often removed, but even when it remains in place
its decisions are sharply constrained while the ﬁrm is under court-sponsored
supervision.
Changes in control serve three purposes in the context of the agency prob-
lems that afﬂict lending arrangements. First, removing existing management
prevents further value-wasting actions. Second, separating management from
the quasi-rents associated with controlling the ﬁrm acts as a pecuniary punish-
ment that helps provide ex ante incentives to manage the ﬁrm faithfully. Third,
control changes facilitate restructuring the ﬁrm’s liabilities in order to realign
them with changed circumstances and allow repayment of creditors that wish
to terminate their relationship with the ﬁrm.
Liquidation will be efﬁcient ex post if it maximizes the total value of the
ﬁrm. Inefﬁcient liquidation—selling the ﬁrm’s assets for less than the value
of the ﬁrm as a going concern—reduces the total expected value of the ﬁrm
when it occurs, and thus reduces the ex ante expected value of the ﬁrm. Ex
ante both parties will prefer provisions that reduce the likelihood of inefﬁcient       
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ex post liquidation. On the other hand, managerial control rents are extinguished
when the ﬁrm is liquidated. The loss of these rents is a social cost of liqui-
dation. Since control rents can only accrue to the managers, lenders will not
take them into account in deciding when to liquidate. The cost of transferring
control rights to lenders is that they will want to liquidate too often—when
liquidation value exceeds the value as an ongoing concern, excluding control
rents. Efﬁcient liquidation rules balance the beneﬁt of control changes against
the cost of inefﬁcient liquidation (Diamond 1993).
Credible Commitments
The circumstances under which control changes take place are determined by
contractual terms (as well as the implicit background rules embodied in the
relevant legal codes) that determine the assignment of property rights under
various contingencies. The borrower and the lender will have an incentive ex
ante to design contractual provisions so that ex post decisions about liquidation
and the allocation of control rights are efﬁcient, in the sense that they max-
imize the expected ongoing value of the concern as a whole, subject to the
constraints imposed by the agency problems they face.6 Loan covenants and
collateral provisions play a central role in structuring the ex post incentives to
effect control changes under line-of-credit arrangements.
Loan Covenants
Under the conditions deﬁned in the covenants, the lender has the right to with-
draw funding. If the borrower cannot obtain funding elsewhere, as is likely (see
discussion below), the lender can essentially force reorganization or liquidation.
Absent violation of the covenants, the borrower retains control of the ﬁrm. Loan
covenants thus can be viewed as a means for conditionally transferring control
of the reorganization/liquidation decision to the lender. Covenants also control
other forms of ex post moral hazard directly by limiting the manager’s right to
take on new risks, change lines of business, assume new indebtedness, and so
on (Aghion and Bolton 1992, Berlin and Mester 1992).
Loan covenants can be quite strong. In practice, however, the violation
of a loan covenant is merely an occasion for renegotiation between lender
and borrower. The lender can waive the violation or use the ability to declare
(technical) default as leverage to obtain more favorable monetary terms or more
stringent covenant conditions (a partial control transfer). Renegotiation allows
outcomes to vary with ex post contingencies in ways that would be difﬁcult
to provide for ahead of time in a formal contract (Huberman and Kahn 1988,
Kahn and Huberman 1989). Strict covenant restrictions can be adopted, with
the expectation that in some circumstances they will be waived or loosened by
6 Not all control changes are instigated by lenders; they can also take place at the initiative
of the ﬁrm’s governing board, presumably representing the interests of shareholders.      
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the lender. Although the borrower and the lender cannot precommit to refrain
from renegotiating, the loan agreement can inﬂuence outcomes by ensuring that
the allocation of property rights depends on future circumstances.
It makes sense, from an ex ante point of view, for the allocation of bargain-
ing rights implied by loan covenants to depend on the riskiness of increased
lending. When covenants are violated, managerial moral hazard is likely to be
more pronounced. If further lending is to take place, the lender must do as well
as if it withdrew the credit line and forced reorganization or liquidation. In
this case covenants put the lender in a position to insist on a higher markup or
more collateral to compensate for the heightened risk of continued lending. If
the lender cannot be satisﬁed—if no such terms or collateral exist—then further
lending is, presumably, ex post inefﬁcient or infeasible, and the borrower is in-
solvent. When covenants are fully satisﬁed, managerial moral hazard is likely
to be muted and so the lender does not need the right to prevent further lending.
The bargaining power rests with the borrower, who is quite likely to be solvent
in this case. Lending takes place at the borrower’s request at the pre-agreed
rate. The ex post self-interest of lenders, the ability to renegotiate, and the
presence of relatively strict loan covenants provide a contractual mechanism
that credibly commits the lender to limit lending when appropriate.
If given the choice ex post, the lender would never want to extend new lend-
ing to an insolvent ﬁrm. A ﬁrm is insolvent when the present discounted value
of future cash ﬂows falls short of the real current value of liabilities. Without
a positive gap between future receipts and future obligations, the present value
of anticipated future repayment streams cannot possibly cover the value of
additional loans. Lending in such circumstances would represent subsidization,
and a proﬁt-maximizing lender has no reason to subsidize customers under
competitive conditions.7
Collateral
The secured lender’s ability to seize collateral for nonpayment is an important
contractual right. A lien on an asset that is essential to the borrower’s operations
can provide the lender with another means of forcing the borrower’s liquidation.
In addition, collateral reduces the lender’s risk by providing compensation when
the borrower cannot pay the obligation in cash, therefore allowing a lower risk
markup. Collateral also sharpens the borrower’s incentive to repay, which helps
relax borrowing constraints by allowing larger credible repayment obligations
(Lacker 1998). Moreover, in bankruptcy, secured debt has a priority claim on
the pledged assets. Collateral thus prevents dilution of the lender’s position.
7 The control rents enjoyed by the manager should, strictly speaking, be counted as part of
the total value of the ﬁrm as a going concern, but since (by deﬁnition) these rents cannot be
pledged to outsiders, they are irrelevant to ﬁnancing decisions.   
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The lender’s ability to take new assets as collateral later in the lending
relationship helps overcome the classic underinvestment problem associated
with debt overhang (Stulz and Johnson 1985). When the value of the ﬁrm is
below the nominal value of outstanding debt, part of the return to any invest-
ment accrues to current debtholders; the real value of their debt increases. By
pledging collateral, the borrower and the new lender can appropriate and share
between them much of the gains from the new investment. Junior lenders can
prohibit ﬁnancing new projects with secured debt by including a “negative
pledge clause” that prohibits pledging collateral to other lenders. Many junior
creditors do not do so, however, since a negative pledge clause has the potential
to prevent value-enhancing investments. For many publicly issued bonds, the
ﬁrm retains the right to ﬁnance new projects with secured debt. Note that the
presence or absence of a negative pledge clause for junior debt is a matter
of contract. Note also that the lender’s decision to take additional collateral is
subject to ex post rationality constraints; it must be in the lender’s self-interest
to do so.
It is important to recognize that collateralized lending is not perfectly safe.
The value realized by seizing and disposing of collateral is uncertain, and in
some circumstances can fall short of the nominal obligation it backs. This
feature is no accident, since borrowers have a greater incentive to default and
surrender collateral when its value has fallen below the value of the debt. Why
would lenders agree to terms under which they may take a loss on collateral? As
previously noted, the key role of collateralized debt is to enhance the repayment
incentive of the borrower. Collateral that is worth more to the borrower than
to the lender, perhaps because of the transactions costs associated with liqui-
dating the collateral, can provide adequate repayment incentives even though
the lender suffers a loss when the borrower defaults and transfers the collateral
(Lacker 1998). Moreover, collateralization alters ex post bargaining positions
in any renegotiation by the borrower and the lender.
Monitoring
As mentioned above, line-of-credit lending is accompanied by costly informa-
tion gathering. Banks assess the borrower’s credit risk prior to the contractual
commitment in order to set contract prices appropriately and to screen inappro-
priate risks. After the lending commitment has been signed, ongoing monitoring
takes place, partly in the form of periodic ﬁnancial statements required by
covenant, and partly through informal contacts. Note that any arbitrary infor-
mation gathering can, in principle, be negotiated as part of the commitment
agreement. For example, many agreements stipulate that the lender receive
audited ﬁnancial reports. In other cases, particularly for small ﬁrms, the burden
of audited statements is judged too costly and unaudited reports are accepted
instead. When the borrower and the lender negotiate the monitoring features of      
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the contract, they presumably balance the marginal value of gathering additional
information against the expected incremental joint cost.
Lenders have a strong incentive to gather information on an ongoing basis
in order to be able to assess the solvency of the borrower as accurately as
possible. Periodic monitoring thus helps prepare the lender to make critical
decisions when the borrower experiences ﬁnancial distress (Rajan and Winton
1995). What is learned about the characteristics of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow can help
the lender interpret payment problems and more accurately assess the value of
the ﬁrm as a going concern. Such information will be useful when the lender
decides whether to extend or deny credit in response to covenant violations. In
comparison, a lender with no prior lending relationship with the borrower will
be at a distinct informational disadvantage.
Information gathering gives rise to “relationship lending” in which ties
between lenders and borrowers are typically long lasting (Berger and Udell
1995, Petersen and Rajan 1994, Petersen and Rajan 1995, and Sharpe 1990).8
This effect is particularly acute in times of distress, when outsiders are un-
able to acquire information fast enough to assist the ﬁrm on the same terms.
The informational hurdles facing alternative lenders make the current lender’s
decision to grant or deny credit all the more crucial. When the informational
advantage of a lending relationship enables a ﬁrm to obtain funds at a low
enough cost to continue operating, and that same ﬁrm would have been unable
to obtain funds cheaply enough without that relationship, we can say that the
ﬁrm is illiquid though solvent. Withdrawing credit in this setting can effectively
force reorganization or liquidation.
Safeguards for the Borrower
From the borrower’s point of view, the important feature of loan covenants
is that they deﬁne the limits of the lender’s power to abrogate the agree-
ment and demand accelerated payment. If the covenants are not violated, the
lender is compelled to lend. As the lending relationship matures over time, the
quasi-rents associated with the lender’s informational advantage over competing
lenders will grow. If the lender had blanket authority to demand repayment,
the lender would be tempted to extort concessions from even a ﬁnancially
healthy borrower. All the quasi-rents from the relationship would inevitably
accrue to the lender. To safeguard the borrower against such opportunistic
behavior, the line-of-credit agreement stipulates that the lender is compelled
to lend at a pre-agreed risk premium, absent any violation of the covenant
conditions.
To summarize, then, line-of-credit agreements are crafted to address an-
ticipated moral hazard problems that may arise if the borrower later gets into
8 Relationship lending can also arise outside of formal line-of-credit lending.        
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trouble. In the presence of loan covenants and collateral provisions, a lender’s
proﬁt motive allows it to credibly commit to making appropriate decisions to
withdraw credit and induce closure or reorganization. Costly periodic monitor-
ing enhances the lender’s ability to gauge the borrower’s situation.
2. CENTRAL BANK LENDING AS A LINE OF CREDIT
In this section we describe the similarities and differences between central
bank lending and lending under private loan commitments. We consider central
bank lending practices against the benchmark of private lending mechanisms,
without prejudging the usefulness of public line-of-credit lending.9 The critical
difference is that the proﬁt motive provides private line-of-credit lenders with
ample incentive to limit lending ex post in the event of borrower adversity.
The comparable incentive for central banks is relatively weak. Indeed, the
commitment problem facing a central bank is the opposite of that facing a
private lender; a lender needs to commit to lend in situations in which it might
not want to lend, while a central bank needs to forego lending when it might
want to lend.
Central Bank Lending
At ﬁrst glance, central bank lending would appear to be quite different from
private line-of-credit lending. Central banks do not generally negotiate
contractual terms with individual borrowers. Instead, they are given statutory
authority to lend to broad classes of institutions. Central banks are publicly
chartered institutions and, unlike private lenders, proﬁt maximization is not
their primary objective.
Despite these apparent differences, central bank lending functions in fun-
damentally the same way as a private line of credit—by providing guaranteed
access to borrowed funds at a predetermined rate. The rate at which central
banks lend is generally posted in advance rather than negotiated ex post with
each individual borrower. Thus central bank lending rates do not appear to vary
much with the borrower’s ex post creditworthiness. At times, distressed bor-
rowers turn to the central bank because terms offered by private lenders would
be exorbitant, either in the cost of explicit ﬁnancing or because the terms would
require surrender of control. Access to central bank credit therefore appears to
provide implicit insurance to those that qualify. One difference between the
pricing of central bank credit and private lines of credit is that central banks
generally do not charge explicit ex ante fees for the service, although one could
9 See Goodhart (1988) and Schwartz (1992) for alternative views on the desirability of central
bank lending.      
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argue that the central bank commitment is bundled together with an array of
regulatory burdens (and privileges).10
In its classic rationale, central bank lending is intended to help illiquid but
solvent ﬁnancial institutions meet their maturing short-term obligations. In the
extreme case, central bank lending might fund a run on demand deposits. Note
that this function closely parallels the role of bank lines of credit in backing
up commercial paper programs. The facility is designed to help a ﬁrm cope
with an emergency “run”—an inability to roll over its credits. As noted above,
a decision to withdraw credit can trigger default on the commercial paper and
closure or reorganization of a ﬁrm.
Compare private and central bank lending with respect to the mechanism
that links credit withdrawal and closure. A private lender denies credit, causing
a default, which leads creditors to seek remedies by seizing assets. The bor-
rower ﬁles for bankruptcy to obtain protection from creditors so that a division
of the losses can be negotiated without destroying ﬁrm value. A central bank
that denies credit to a bank forces the hand of the chartering agency or the
deposit insurance fund. The central bank’s critical role in bank closure brings
it face-to-face with the government agencies that have direct responsibility for
closing banks.
Agency Problems
A vast array of bank management decisions involves risk-return trade-offs.
Attitudes toward risk are to some degree distorted at any leveraged entity,
because some decisions affect the value of debtholders’ claims. Banks are
among the most highly leveraged of institutions. At well-capitalized banks, the
value of future control-rents is an asset that acts as an implicit performance
bond that offsets risk-taking incentives. When net worth falls, however, the
value of the implicit bond vanishes and incentives ﬂip toward risk-taking—
little is left to lose. It is widely recognized that the management of a poorly
capitalized bank has incentives to take on excessive risks in an attempt to
gamble its way out of trouble. When supervisory restraint is lax—as during
the U.S. savings and loan crisis, or in the recent emerging markets banking
crises—moral hazard steadily grows as the losses pile up (Calomiris 1998).
Private banks make explicit case-by-case decisions to grant lines of credit.
In contrast, central bank lending commitments are not usually made on an
individual basis. Often legislative and regulatory policies delimit the set of
institutions that have access to central bank credit. Sometimes the set of
10 See Kwast and Passmore (1997) for evidence on the net subsidy provided by the ﬁnancial
safety net in the United States.     
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institutions with access is quite large.11 The key difference is that private
institutions are able to condition the commitment on an examination of the
prospective borrower’s ﬁnancial health and then tailor the contractual terms to
the individual borrower. In contrast, access to central bank credit is granted to
broad categories of institutions. Also, the terms of central bank lending do not
reﬂect the competitive discipline of arm’s-length bargaining.
Central bank supervision of institutions with access to central bank credit is
a direct counterpart to the ongoing monitoring performed by banks. Supervisory
reports, like the periodic ﬁnancial statements provided to line-of-credit lenders,
keep authorities apprised of changes in the creditworthiness of the prospec-
tive borrower. Even for central banks without a direct supervisory role, access
to such information performs the same function. Supervisory information is
generally far more detailed than the reporting required of private line-of-credit
customers. As noted earlier, private contracts can, in principle, mandate stricter
disclosure, but there are impediments to doing so. In the United States, pro-
visions of bankruptcy law discourage lenders from becoming so intimate with
the management of the ﬁrm as to be deemed an “insider” (Baird 1993).
Like private line-of-credit lending, central bank lending is generally collat-
eralized. Speciﬁc assets can be documented and evaluated in advance, drawing
on the central bank’s supervisory knowledge. In addition, the security interests
of central banks are generally favored in bank failure resolutions. This fact
tends to make central bank lending relatively safe, although, as noted above,
collateralized lending is not risk-free in general.
When central banks lend to government-insured institutions, collateral
plays a crucial role in the loan’s effect on the insurance fund in the event
of a failure. Collateralized lending dilutes junior claimants, which in the case
of an insured bank includes depositors. The insurance fund stands in for the
depositors in the event of closure, however, so central bank lending effectively
dilutes the deposit insurance fund. For example, in the United States, the FDIC
assumes the failed bank’s indebtedness to the Federal Reserve and in exchange
retains the pledged assets. When the Fed lends to allow a failing bank to pay
maturing short-term obligations the insurance fund retains the collateral, but
the maturing short-term obligations have been replaced by a ﬁxed obligation to
the Fed. If the short-term claimants whose funds were withdrawn are insured
depositors, the operation has merely replaced one ﬁxed obligation for another. It
is a different matter, however, if some short-term claimants are uninsured. The
11 In the United States, for example, all depository institutions that are subject to reserve
requirements are eligible to borrow at the Federal Reserve’s discount window. In addition, Section
13 of the Federal Reserve Act allows the Board of Governors to authorize the Reserve Banks “in
unusual and exigent circumstances” to extend credit to any individual, partnership, or corporation,
provided the Reserve Bank obtains evidence that such entity “is unable to secure adequate credit
accommodations from other banking institutions.”      
14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
short-term claimants would have shared in the losses with the FDIC had the
central bank not lent.12 Instead, the insurance fund inherits a bank in which an
uninsured claim held by the private sector is replaced by a ﬁxed senior claim
held by the Federal Reserve. In the process, closure is delayed and private
uninsured creditors are spared.
The Commitment Problem
With private lines of credit, lender proﬁt maximization provides an incentive
to advance credit only when it is ex post efﬁcient to do so. The environ-
ment surrounding central bank lending is quite different. A central bank has
a legislated responsibility for the stability of the ﬁnancial system as a whole:
it could be blamed for any negative consequences of not lending. A central
bank that precipitates the demise of one or more ﬁnancial institutions may be
subject to direct action through the legal system or indirect action through the
legislature. It is impossible to prove the counterfactual, i.e., that not lending and
letting a troubled ﬁrm fail would not seriously disrupt markets. Furthermore,
it is difﬁcult for outsiders to question, after the fact, a central bank’s judgment
on such matters. For all of these reasons, central banks are inclined to lend
whenever ﬁnancial stability is at all threatened.
Central banks are careful to protect their loans by taking collateral. In fact,
some central banks lend only on terms that virtually guarantee repayment in
full. In the United States, for example, discount window loans are virtually
always collateralized, assuring priority in closure (Hackley 1973). Moreover,
the FDIC generally assumes the debt that the borrowing bank owes the Fed in
exchange for the collateral, relieving the Fed of the risk of falling collateral
value. This arrangement allows the Reserve Banks to avoid loan losses but
has the effect of shifting losses to the deposit insurance agency (Marino and
Bennett 1999).
Implicitly restricting central bank lending to be risk-free by taking collateral
is a “bright line” policy that is easy to verify ex post. Such a policy is one
way to limit central bank involvement in the allocation of credit and to restrict
the scope for subsidization. Limits to the central bank’s involvement in credit
allocation can help buttress the central bank’s independence and bolster the
ﬁscal discipline of the deposit insurance fund (Goodfriend 1994). One might
think that such a bright-line no-loss policy would sharpen the central bank’s
incentives, bringing them more closely in line with those of a private line-of-
credit provider. By itself, however, taking collateral is not enough, because the
central bank then has no pecuniary reason not to lend.
12 This presumes the current depositor preference regime. In the absence of a depositor pref-
erence law, the short-term claimants would have been junior to the FDIC’s claim. See Birchler
(forthcoming) and Marino and Bennett (1999) for discussion of depositor preference law. Marino
and Bennett also discuss the role of Federal Reserve lending in delaying closure of failed banks.      
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Lending by the central bank creates a potentially severe moral hazard prob-
lem. Markets expect the central bank to provide the bank with the funds to
allow the exit of uninsured liquid claimholders. Thus, lending by central banks
facilitates a reallocation of wealth among the creditors of a failing bank that
the deposit insurance fund has neither the capability nor the legal authority to
perform by itself. Private lending to a failing ﬁrm is subject to the safeguards
of bankruptcy law. This includes the fraudulent conveyance provision, which
under certain conditions allows the court to unwind transactions, including loan
agreements, that occurred immediately prior to bankruptcy if such agreements
disadvantaged the bankrupt ﬁrm’s estate. Collateralized central bank lending
accompanied by indemniﬁcation from the deposit insurance fund is subject to
no such formal discipline, only the vagaries of the political system.13
The ﬁnancial stability mandate can create pressure to expand the scope
of central bank lending to nonbank ﬁnancial institutions. Nonbank ﬁnancial
intermediaries are capable of amassing sizable ﬁnancial market positions. The
liquidation of these positions could be seen as a threat to the stability of asset
prices and the solvency of many other ﬁnancial institutions, including insured
banks. A central bank with no formal authority to lend outside a narrowly
deﬁned set of institutions is, of course, well positioned to resist inﬂuence. Oth-
erwise, we might see a tendency to expand the range of institutions receiving
central bank line-of-credit assistance.14
We conclude that the incentives for a central bank to limit lending are
relatively weak. As a result, we should expect to see a tendency for central
banks to overextend lending, creating moral hazard problems among institu-
tions deemed likely to qualify for central bank credit. Moreover, the rate of
incidence of ﬁnancial distress that calls for central bank lending should tend
to increase over time as market participants come to understand the range of
the central bank’s actual (implicit) commitment to lend and adjust expectations
accordingly.
3. COPING WITH THE COMMITMENT PROBLEM
To summarize the argument so far, we have seen how commercial banks efﬁ-
ciently and proﬁtably structure contracts to support private lines of credit. They
do so because (1) their own money is at stake, (2) they can choose their
borrower relationships, (3) the conditions include the right to monitor the value
of assets on an ex ante (ongoing) basis to distinguish illiquid from insolvent
borrowers in the event of a request for funds, (4) loan covenants give the
lender the right to withdraw credit when the borrower’s ﬁnancial condition
13 For an account of Federal Reserve lending to depository institutions, see U. S. Congress
(1991). See also Marino and Bennett (1999).
14 For an account of Federal Reserve lending to nonbanks, see Garcia (1990).      
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has deteriorated, and (5) competition and proﬁt maximization induce private
providers to balance the risks of accommodating a request for funds against the
costs of not lending. To be competitive, the terms of the line-of-credit product
must not exploit borrowers; and to be proﬁtable, the credit line must provide a
risk-adjusted return comparable to products offered by other banks.
Central banks provide lines of credit under such different circumstances
that we cannot presume they will make lending decisions appropriately. First,
ﬁnancial losses are not borne by the central bank but by the Treasury, and,
ultimately, taxpayers. Second, a central bank cannot offer “take-it-or-leave-
it” conditions because it is responsible for protecting ﬁnancial markets as a
whole and may not be able to refuse to lend to an institution whose failure
might threaten the system. Third, for the reason mentioned above, a central
bank might feel pressure to lend to an institution that it does not examine
thoroughly, or at all. Fourth, a central bank is not disciplined by competition
or proﬁt maximization.
At any point in time, then, a central bank will be more inclined to lend
whenever not lending could threaten the entire ﬁnancial system. Such incen-
tives ensure that the central bank carries out its legislative mandate to stabilize
ﬁnancial markets. The problem is that the inclination to lend creates in the
public’s mind an expectation that a ﬁnancial institution in a protected class
can count on credit assistance from the central bank in certain adverse future
circumstances. Private lenders will take advantage of central bank assistance
by monitoring less and accepting greater credit risks when lending to implic-
itly protected ﬁrms. Further, borrowing ﬁrms in the protected class will take
advantage, too, by taking on increasingly risky assets. Over time, the central
bank will be inclined to expand the class of ﬁrms perceived to be protected
and the extent of protection.
The fundamental problem is to ﬁnd a way to credibly commit to limit
lending.15 It is a difﬁcult problem and there are no easy solutions. In what
follows we consider the practical effectiveness of ﬁve broad approaches to the
commitment problem.
Good Ofﬁces Only
In lieu of establishing a practical means of committing a central bank to refrain
from lending except in deserving circumstances, we could imagine legislation
precluding a central bank from extending its own credit under any circum-
stances. This possibility is worth considering because a central bank could still
play a useful and effective role in facilitating private credit transactions or those
of other national or international agencies. A central bank has three institutional
15 Some question the need for any discount window lending at all. See Goodfriend and King
(1988) and Schwartz (1992). Adherents of this view can interpret our analysis as an exploration
of the means by which a central bank might limit its lending in practice.   
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strengths in this regard. First, its ﬁnancial independence and independence from
the budget process makes it impartial with respect to ﬁnancial matters, unlike
most other government agencies, or, for that matter, ﬁrms in the private sector.
Second, a central bank has a large staff with practical experience in econom-
ics, supervision and regulation, payments system operations, and ﬁnancial law.
Third, in the course of carrying out their normal duties, high central bank
ofﬁcials develop personal relationships with their counterparts in the private
sector.
Thus, a central bank could offer its “good ofﬁces” to help private creditors
negotiate a troubled ﬁnancial ﬁrm’s recapitalization. The central bank might
have knowledge of the troubled ﬁrm through existing supervisory relationships.
Also it might be in a position to “certify” the solvency of the ﬁrm to others,
essentially facilitating “due diligence” efforts. Even in the absence of ex ante
central bank knowledge of the institution, the central bank might inspect the
portfolio for others, acting as a trusted third party. Furthermore, in negotiations
among members of a potential lending consortium, the central bank might play
the role of neutral arbitrator.
In principle, the extension of good ofﬁces need not involve pressure or
sweeteners from the central bank. In practice, however, as long as a central
bank retains supervisory and regulatory powers, one could not be sure whether
private parties to the agreement were inﬂuenced implicitly by a concern about
punishment should they not sign on to a deal. In effect, then, a deal could have
been facilitated by implicitly directed credit allocation because of the central
bank’s involvement. The parties could also believe that regulatory authorities,
including the central bank, would forbear if the institutions that lent became
troubled themselves. Of course, a deal could very well involve a considerable
transfer of equity from the original owners to the new owners of the troubled
ﬁrm. If a central bank presides over a deal more favorable to the original owners
than they would have received without its help, moral hazard has increased.
One way to ensure that no implicit pressure or sweeteners are involved
when a central bank uses its good ofﬁces would be to take the central bank out
of bank supervision and regulation. But then the central bank would lose the
professional and personal connections that make it a good facilitator in the ﬁrst
place. The upshot is that even limiting a central bank’s role to one of facilitator
tends to create in the public’s mind the possibility of assistance of one kind or
another.
Lending Hurdles
Recognizing that there are circumstances when central bank lending would be
desirable in order to protect the ﬁnancial system, we consider various hurdles
designed to limit the central bank’s inclination to lend except in extreme cir-
cumstances and to limit its own exposure if it does lend. We deal with these      
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issues in reverse order. First, we consider the taking of collateral. After that,
we consider the effectiveness of hurdles that a central bank might be made to
clear before it is authorized to lend in the ﬁrst place.
Collateral
Some central banks lend only on good collateral to fully protect their funds in
the event that the borrower cannot repay. The taking of good collateral certainly
protects the ﬁnancial integrity of central banks themselves. As discussed above,
however, collateralized lending does not limit the exposure of the insurance
fund and taxpayers.
Its lending well protected, a central bank would have little incentive to
precipitate a borrower’s insolvency by refusing to lend. When a central bank
supervises a borrowing bank, it is in a good position to evaluate the illiquid
portions of a portfolio for purposes of collateral and can keep a bank operating
for some time. In effect, central bank lending provides uninsured creditors of
a troubled bank with free insurance (which encourages uninsured creditors to
invest at shorter maturities) and delays the time when a troubled bank would
default to one of its creditors and trigger its closing and reorganization. Assets
that could have remained in the bank, if it had been closed sooner, are pledged
to the central bank and are unavailable to help the deposit insurance fund and
the taxpayers pay off insured deposits. Full collateralization of central bank
lending conceals the fact that such lending exposes the insurance fund and the
taxpayer to a risk of loss.
Early Intervention
One option for better protecting the deposit insurance fund and the taxpayer is
to require bank regulators to close a failing bank when its book value equity
capital falls to, say, 2 percent rather than to the point of book insolvency.
A deterioration of book capital could trigger progressively heavier regulatory
restrictions. Such restrictions might prohibit additional central bank lending
at some point, unless the highest ofﬁcials in the government grant written
permission to lend.16
The problem with this hurdle is that it is based on book rather than market
value capital. When depository institutions have assets that are in large part
illiquid non-traded loans, they could become insolvent on a market value basis
well before they are declared insolvent on a book value basis. For example,
consider the Bank of New England which was declared insolvent in January
1991. Soon after, the FDIC released estimates that the deposit insurance claim
would cost the taxpayer around $2 billion. Why didn’t the regulators act sooner?
16 The “prompt corrective action” provisions of the FDICIA encourage early closure and
help to restrict central bank lending in this way.   
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The Bank of New England’s problems began when the mortgage loans
it made in the mid-1980s turned bad. Real estate proved unable to earn a
sufﬁcient return to cover the loan payments. The bank, however, still had to
pay competitive interest on deposits. So the bank had to divert to depositors a
portion of the return on assets that had been going to equity holders. The cut
in dividends caused the stock price to fall precipitously, and the bank could not
meet the competitive deposit rate payments by reducing dividends alone. The
bank had to sell off securities, pledge assets to the Federal Reserve’s discount
window, and obtain Treasury deposits in order to fund withdrawals of uninsured
deposits and pay interest to the remaining depositors. The negative cash ﬂow
eventually reduced the book value net worth enough for regulators to seize the
bank.
In this case it may be said that regulators were too slow in writing down
the value of loans. It is well to remember, however, that there are often good
reasons to be cautious. The market value of a loan is the present discounted
value of future cash ﬂows. Although current cash ﬂows may be small, there is
usually room for disagreement among analysts concerning future cash ﬂows.
Therefore, any write-down by a regulator is subjective and subject to challenge
ex post by high government ofﬁcials or by the bank in question itself. As a
result, hurdles based on measured capital deﬁciencies that are designed to pro-
tect the deposit insurance fund and the taxpayer against losses due to excessive
central bank lending might not work very well in practice.
Constructive Ambiguity
The above argument suggests that one cannot count on simple mechanistic
hurdles to limit a central bank’s inclination to lend. The problem is that ﬁnan-
cial markets know that there are circumstances in which a central bank would
not refuse to lend to troubled institutions. Thus, owners of institutions that are
big enough or central enough to the payments system or to ﬁnancial markets
more generally have an incentive to increase their risk exposure in just those
circumstances. Owners know that they keep the upside returns if things go well,
but share any losses more broadly, i.e., with the central bank, an insurance fund,
or the taxpayer, if things go badly.
This sort of logic puts a central bank in a box. A central banker’s willing-
ness to support the ﬁnancial system in times of potential crisis (to maintain the
conﬁdence necessary to facilitate the functioning of ﬁnancial markets and the
economy more broadly) actually causes risks in the system to grow. For this
reason, a central bank might be inclined to keep markets guessing about the
exact circumstances in which it would be willing to lend. By creating uncer-
tainty in the minds of potential borrowers, such ambiguity might be thought
to be constructive because it causes potential borrowers to take on less risk.
Constructive ambiguity, under this interpretation, attempts to reduce market  
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participants’ perception of the probability of central bank lending while re-
serving the central bank’s option to lend when systemic concerns seem to
require it.
Some ambiguity is unavoidable in any attempt to state the precise contin-
gencies in which a central bank might lend. The true policy would depend on
information available to the central bank at a future date, some of which might
be private information about speciﬁc ﬁrms known only to the central bank.
A policy that needs to be based on private unpublishable information would
not be veriﬁable and so could not be made completely free of uncertainty and
ambiguity. Moreover, lending policies that depend on future circumstances in
complicated ways might be difﬁcult to state with clarity in advance.
That said, one might ask whether a central bank might want to deliber-
ately increase the uncertainty surrounding its lending intentions. At one level,
ambiguity can be enhanced by not attempting to sharpen or clarify the broad
principles of central bank lending in internal discussions or external speeches
of high central bank ofﬁcials. Over time, however, markets will learn the cen-
tral bank’s actual lending policy. If the central bank does not follow through
with actions that ratify the announced ambiguity, its rhetoric will ultimately
be disregarded. Market expectations will converge on the central bank’s actual
policy. To be sustainable, therefore, a policy of constructive ambiguity has to
be demonstrated in a central bank’s lending actions themselves.
In order to increase ambiguity, a central bank would have to add extrane-
ous variability to its lending policy—it would have to play a “mixed strategy”
in game-theoretic terms. In effect, a central bank would have to couple each
lending decision with a spin of a roulette wheel that would randomly point to
“follow through” or “not follow through.” The central bank would need to be
willing to abide by the wheel. That is, with some probability the central bank
would lend when its better judgment said the situation did not call for it; and
with some probability the central bank would have to follow the wheel and not
lend when it would otherwise wish to do so.
Randomization can be economically useful. For example, tax authorities
audit randomly, with audit probabilities that vary with some basic features of
the return. Randomization balances the beneﬁcial incentive effects on taxpayer
behavior against the expected resource cost of the audits. Tax authorities are
able to implement mixed strategies credibly because they have learned over
time that failing to audit eventually leads to increased tax evasion.
The problem with adding variability to central bank lending policy is that
the central bank would have trouble sticking to it, for the same reason that
central banks tend to overextend lending to begin with. An announced policy
of constructive ambiguity does nothing to alter the ex post incentives that cause
central banks to lend in the ﬁrst place. In any particular instance the central
bank would want to ignore the spin of the wheel.      
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Constructive ambiguity in the absence of an ability to precommit may ac-
tually increase the drift toward expansion. The greater the perceived probability
of lending by the central bank in various circumstances, the greater the risk-
taking incentive for eligible institutions. Whenever the central bank is seen to
lend in a situation in which it had not lent before, perceived probabilities will
be revised upward, inducing greater risk-taking.17
Extended Supervisory and Regulatory Reach
A central bank could consider extending its supervisory and regulatory au-
thority, or the authority of other government agencies, to all institutions to
which it might possibly wish to lend. In principle, such authority would enable
the central bank to limit risk-taking directly. A central bank might extend its
regulatory authority to ﬁnancial institutions, banking or otherwise, big enough
or central enough to threaten the ﬁnancial system if they failed.
There are many problems with attempting to control risks by extending
regulatory authority. First, regulatory reach does not extend across international
borders. An attempt to regulate ﬁnancial ﬁrms too heavily may cause them to
locate in those countries willing to impose little regulation in order to attract
the business. Second, an attempt to extend regulation within a country causes
new institutional forms to develop to escape regulation. Third, the proliferation
of new ﬁnancial instruments associated with derivatives enables institutions to
synthesize ﬁnancial positions in many ways. Sophisticated ﬁnancial engineer-
ing has made circumventing regulatory restrictions much easier. It has become
very difﬁcult for regulators to monitor and regulate transactions, i.e., balance
sheet and off-balance-sheet positions of a ﬁrm. This development prompted the
movement from direct supervision of balance sheet items toward a supervisory
philosophy focused on institutions’ risk management and control processes.
If central banks extend supervisory and regulatory authority to a broader
array of ﬁnancial institutions, they risk a positive feedback effect on central
bank lending policy. Supervisory involvement in a ﬁnancial sector can “taint”
government authorities with implicit responsibility for the health of institutions
in that sector, heightening the perception that the central bank is willing to
lend to them in the event of liquidity problems. A central bank might ﬁnd it
costly to disappoint such expectations. In other words, extending the breadth
of supervision and regulation could induce a commensurate extension of the
perceived central bank lending commitment.
Supervision and regulation has its place as part of a line-of-credit package,
but it is oversold as a means of controlling risk-taking by ﬁrms that could
17 Note that for the tax authority, the fraction of returns that are audited is published and
may have far more impact on perceived audit probabilities than an individual audit. In contrast,
because the frequency of central bank lending is much lower, individual instances may have a
far greater effect on market expectations of future lending.       
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potentially beneﬁt from having access to central bank lending on favorable
terms.
Reputation Building
In our view, none of the above institutional mechanisms can credibly commit
a central bank to limit its lending or prevent increased risk-taking induced by a
central bank’s inability to limit its lending commitment. However, we believe
that a central bank could credibly commit to limit its lending by building a
reputation for doing so. Given the pressures that a central bank faces, there
might seem to be little hope that it could ever build a reputation for lending
restraint. It is difﬁcult to imagine how a central bank would begin to do so.
Yet, we think that the experience by which central banks around the world have
built a reputation for maintaining low inﬂation provides a road map for how
they might credibly commit to limit lending.
Building a Reputation for Low Inﬂation18
In the 1960s, the inﬂation that accompanied stimulative monetary policy was
tolerated as a necessary evil in the United States because it seemed consistent
with a stable Phillips curve tradeoff between unemployment and inﬂation. In
retrospect, however, we see that workers and ﬁrms came to anticipate delib-
erately expansionary monetary policy. Workers learned to take advantage of
tight labor markets to make higher wage demands, and ﬁrms took advantage of
tight product markets to pass along higher costs in higher prices. Increasingly
aggressive wage and price behavior tended to neutralize the favorable employ-
ment effects of expansionary monetary policy, and the Federal Reserve became
evermore expansionary in pursuit of low unemployment.
In the 1970s, disaffection with inﬂationary policy arose as the Phillips curve
correlation broke down and both inﬂation and unemployment moved higher. In
the late 1960s, the Fed began periodically to try to brake the acceleration of
inﬂation with tight monetary policy, well aware that such policy actions caused
unemployment to rise. The resulting stop/go monetary policy characterized the
period from the mid-’60s until the early 1980s. Finally, the great disinﬂation
introduced a period in which the Federal Reserve gradually acquired credibility
for low inﬂation.
Two developments paved the way for the great disinﬂation. First was the
progress that economists made in understanding the causes of inﬂation. This
professional understanding reinforced the Fed’s conﬁdence that monetary policy
could bring inﬂation down. Second, two decades of nonmonetary approaches
18 This account is drawn from Goodfriend (1997).   
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to controlling inﬂation—for example, wage/price guidelines and controls, ﬁscal
budget policy, and credit controls—had been tried and had failed.
By the time Paul Volcker became Federal Reserve Chairman in 1979, inﬂa-
tionary policy was widely recognized to have costs with no offsetting beneﬁts.
Previous experience with stop/go policy made clear that bringing inﬂation down
would be costly too. Indeed, the inﬂation was not broken until a sustained
tightening of monetary policy that began in 1981 created a serious recession
that tested the Federal Reserve’s determination and the public’s support. With
widespread public support, the Federal Reserve has maintained low inﬂation
for almost two decades. Macroeconomic performance has been good compared
to that of the inﬂationary period, and only one mild recession has occurred thus
far—in 1990 to 1991.
Building a Reputation for Limited Lending
The analogy to the historical reduction of inﬂation provides a road map for
a central bank that seeks to acquire a reputation for lending restraint. We
might imagine the following sequence of events. Initially, the central bank
and the public alike recognize only the short-term beneﬁts of central bank
lending. Central banks are inclined to extend emergency credit assistance to
any institution whose possible failure could present even the most remote risk
of disruption to the ﬁnancial system. The liberal lending policy encourages
potential beneﬁciary ﬁrms to take on more risks. Greater risk-taking, in turn,
creates more frequent crises and causes the central bank to extend the scope
of its lending even further. Policymakers and the public see the frequency and
magnitude of ﬁnancial crises grow even as the willingness of the central bank
to lend increases.
Gradually, under this scenario, an understanding might emerge among
policymakers and the public that excessively liberal central bank lending is
counterproductive. The view would be supported by economists’ improved
understanding of the causes of increasing risk in the ﬁnancial system and its
relation to excessive central bank lending. As central bankers come to feel
overextended, they might be more inclined to incur the risk of short-run dis-
ruptions in ﬁnancial markets by disappointing expectations and by not lending
as freely as before. The central bank might backtrack on its initial attempts to
disappoint lending expectations. Eventually, the public might decide that the
increased ﬁnancial crises were, in part, due to excessively liberal central bank
lending. The public would want the central bank to become more restrictive,
even at the cost of precipitating a ﬁnancial disruption by refusing to lend in a
particular crisis. Ultimately, with the public’s support and a consistent willing-
ness to risk the consequences, a central bank would acquire a reputation for
more limited lending. Financial ﬁrms might then take on less risk, and ﬁnancial
market crises might become less common.   
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One might wonder where we are in this process today. The parallel with
monetary policy is again instructive. During the 20 years of great inﬂation
there were four major episodes (1966, 1968, 1973-74, 1979-82) in which the
Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy to restrain inﬂation with adverse
consequences for employment. It was not until the savings and loan crisis of
the mid-1980s that the public became aware of the greater risk-taking engen-
dered by the government ﬁnancial safety net, e.g., deposit insurance and central
bank lending. To date, there are no instances in which a ﬁnancial crisis has
followed a refusal by the Federal Reserve to extend emergency credit assistance.
Granted, provisions of the FDICIA of 1991 impose some constraints on Federal
Reserve lending to failing institutions: lending to undercapitalized depository
institutions is limited, except in circumstances involving “systemic risk” (re-
quiring high-level certiﬁcation), and the Fed is exposed to minor losses. These
provisions, however, hardly constrain discount window lending; for example,
it appears that Fed lending to Continental Illinois in 1984 would have met the
requirements of the 1991 Act.
There is little evidence yet that the general public in the United States favors
a signiﬁcantly more restrictive lending policy for the central bank. One might
regard the Bank of England’s handling of the Barings closure as an instance of
a move toward a more restrictive lending policy. But the parallel with monetary
policy suggests that episodes of increasing severity may be necessary before
central banks deﬁnitively alter course in the direction of lending restraint.
4. CONCLUSION
We have presented some guiding principles for central bank lending. Central
bank lending should be regarded as a line of credit, and should be expected to
exhibit the tensions inherent in private line-of-credit products. The most serious
problem is managerial moral hazard, the borrower’s incentive to take on more
risk after arranging a credit line. We discussed in some detail contractual pro-
visions (loan covenants, collateral, and monitoring) designed to control moral
hazard. The key point is that contractual provisions enable proﬁt-maximizing
lenders to credibly commit to withdraw credit and induce the closure or reor-
ganization of a borrowing ﬁrm when appropriate.
The contractual mechanisms utilized by private line-of-credit providers are
less effective for a central bank whose primary mission—to maintain ﬁnan-
cial system stability—can override its obligation to protect public funds and
undercut its ability to limit lending. We considered in some detail ﬁve broad
approaches to a central bank’s commitment problem: offering good ofﬁces only,
intervening early and taking collateral, adopting a strategy of constructive am-
biguity, extending supervisory and regulatory reach, and building a reputation.
Our analysis suggested that the ﬁrst four institutional approaches cannot be    
M. Goodfriend and J. M. Lacker: Central Bank Lending 25
counted on to overcome the fundamental forces causing a central bank to lend.
On the other hand, we believe that it should be possible for a central bank
to build a reputation for limiting its lending commitment, just as central banks
around the world acquired credibility for low inﬂation. In fact, we view the
forces operating on central bank lending policy as analogous to those inﬂuenc-
ing the path of inﬂation. Liberal lending policy initially raises expectations of
lending. There is more frequent lending, increased moral hazard, and greater
ﬁnancial instability. Gradually, policymakers and the public become willing
to disappoint lending expectations. The economy then experiences a temporary
period of heightened ﬁnancial instability associated with increasingly restrictive
lending, which is followed by less ﬁnancial instability and little central bank
lending. It would appear that we are still at the initial stages of what could be
a lengthy process.
We are agnostic about whether central bank lending is beneﬁcial. We put
off consideration of that difﬁcult question until central bank lending is more
restrained, just as the debate on the desirability of low or zero inﬂation in
the steady state was deferred until inﬂation was brought down sufﬁciently.
Currently, the critical policy question is how to reverse perceptions that cen-
tral banks are increasingly willing to lend, which increases risk-taking and
the likelihood that central banks will feel compelled to lend. Just as mone-
tary policymakers looked for opportunities to disinﬂate, we think that ﬁnancial
economists and central bankers should look for opportunities to restrain central
bank lending.
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